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HE diversity of issues presented under the umbrella referred to as
Construction Law requires an array of expertise from its practi-
tioners, making the practice area both interesting and challenging.
Once thought of by the un-initiated as the baileywick of mechanics' liens,
subcontractor disputes, and the occasional delay and disruption claim,
this year's Article reflects the breadth of this industry driven practice.
Each year there are more cases decided by Texas courts, and by federal
courts applying Texas law, relating to construction disputes than can, or
should, be reported in this Annual Survey. Fortunately, most of them are
either reiterations of well established law, involve narrow points of law,
or are so fact intensive that the editing process is somewhat simplified.
Nevertheless, this year's collection is somewhat thematic in nature, and it
is therefore possible that a noteworthy case has by necessity been omit-
ted. With apologies to those who feel we have left out your favorite case,
the following is a survey of significant and interesting construction law
cases presented during the period.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Of great importance to contractors doing business with the State of
Texas, and the lawyers representing them, is the applicability of the Doc-
trine of Sovereign Immunity to contracts with the state or state agencies.
The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity is based upon the ancient common
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law principle that "the King can do no wrong." The modernized restate-
ment of this rule is a form of the Golden Rule: he who has the gold makes
the rules. Texas courts have held for many years (in fact since statehood),
that the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine immunized the state from lawsuits
brought without its consent.' Accordingly, practitioners in the construc-
tion law field and their clients have anticipated perhaps even bated
breath for the Texas Supreme Court's pronouncement in the case of Fed-
eral Sign v. Texas Southern University.2 This case was argued before
Texas' highest court on November 28, 1996, and was decided on June 20,
1997, with a motion for rehearing overruled on October 2, 1997. The
result was disappointing, to say the least, and should be cause for concern
to every contractor doing business with the State of Texas.
Federal Sign submitted a bid to Texas Southern University (TSU) for
the construction and delivery of basketball scoreboards for TSU's new
Health and Physical Education facility. After accepting Federal Sign's
bid, TSU instructed the company to begin building the scoreboards.
However, before Federal Sign delivered the scoreboards, TSU notified
Federal Sign that its bid was unacceptable and entered into a contract
with another manufacturer. Federal Sign thereafter filed suit for breach
of contract and violation of competitive bidding and open meeting laws.3
The trial court rendered judgment for Federal Sign's breach of contract
claim and awarded Federal Sign damages.4 The Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peals reversed the trial court on the basis of immunity from suit and re-
manded the case with instructions to dismiss. 5
In what should have been an unsurprising opinion by the Texas
Supreme Court, the issue was laid to rest, or, at least it appears that a
majority of the court intended to lay to rest, the issue of sovereign immu-
nity. Justice Baker, writing for the court, held that while waiving immu-
nity from liability by contracting, a state agency could not be sued for
breach of contract unless the State Legislature consented to such a Suit.6
Essentially, the court recognized two distinct principles of sovereign im-
munity: (1) immunity from suit; and (2) immunity from liability.7
The court held that both principles of sovereign immunity, unless
waived, protect the State from suits for damages and provide immunity
from liability.8 In this case, Federal Sign did not receive legislative per-
mission to sue TSU prior to filing suit. However, the court held that
when the State contracts with private citizens, the State waives immunity
from liability, but not immunity from suit.9 During the Survey period, the
1. Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997) (citing Hosner v.
DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764 (1847)).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 403.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 404.
6. See id. at 408.
7. See id. at 405.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 405-06.
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Texas Supreme Court dealt with additional appellate court opinions that
seem to erode the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine. The court concluded
that these cases essentially are based upon the old Texas Supreme Court
opinion in Fristoe v. Blum, l0 but that reliance upon the Fristoe opinion
was not appropriate because Fristoe neither involved a breach of contract
claim against the state nor directly involved sovereign immunity.
After resolving what the court viewed as a conflict of authority on
whether the State, by entering into a contract with a private citizen,
waives immunity from suit, the court noted:
We hasten to observe that neither this case nor the ones on which it
relies should be read too broadly. We do not attempt to decide this
issue in any other circumstances other than the one before us today.
There may be other circumstances where the State may waive its im-
munity by conduct other than simply executing a contract so that it is
not always immune from suit when it contracts.11
It is apparent from this observation that while the court intended to lay
to rest the sleeping giant of sovereign immunity, the court did everything
but pour cold water on it. Not only did the court restrict its rationale to
the facts of this case, but the majority based its decision on the principle
of stare decis and deferred to the legislature as the concurring opinion
emphasized. 12 The court stated that "[t]oday, we again hold that it is the
Legislature's province to modify sovereign immunity if it is inclined to do
so and therefore refuse Federal Sign's invitation to undertake that
task."1 3 It appears that after such statement, we find ourselves in agree-
ment with the master of malapropisms, Yogi Berra, because at least in
this arena, "it ain't over 'til it's over," and it ain't over.
The court then went on to reject Federal Sign's assertions that sover-
eign immunity violates the Texas Constitution's Open Courts and Due
Course of Law clauses.14 Attempting to persuade the court to judicially
dispose of sovereign immunity in the contract context, Federal Sign raised
a number of issues including lack of mutuality of remedy, curtailment of
legislative power to contract and to delegate the power to contract, the
contravention of the open court provision of the State Constitution, lack
of due course of law, and lack of due process. All of these arguments,
while facially appealing, were rejected by the court. The court stated that
although Federal Sign had a remedy if it sought the legislature's consent
to sue, Federal Sign just chose not to avail itself of such relief.15 How-
ever, as noted by the dissent and the concurrence, since the enactment of
Chapter 107 of the Texas Civil Practice And Remedies Code in 1987, only
nine out of 173 proposed resolutions were passed granting consent-a
10. 92 Tex. 76, 45 S.W. 998 (1898).
11. Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 408 n.1.
12. See id. at 412-13.
13. Id. at 409.




rate of six percent. 16
The hypothetical situation of full performance proposed, but left un-
resolved, by Justice Hecht in the concurrence was addressed in Alamo
Community College District v. Obayashi Corp. 17 Some have argued that
the supreme court's denial of a writ of error in Fireman's Insurance v.
Board of Regents of the University of Texas System 18 on the same day the
court decided Federal Sign and subsequently overruled a motion for re-
hearing closed the door on this issue. Fireman involved alleged breaches
after performance by the contractor and its surety. However, the Alamo
court noted that a denial of a writ of error does not "necessarily reflect
the court's approval or even its consideration of the merits of the case." 19
The Alamo court ultimately held that a community college waived its sov-
ereign immunity from suit by conduct other than the mere execution of
the contract and that the Texas Legislature waived immunity from suit
pursuant to sections 11.151(a), 130.084, and 130.162 of the Texas Educa-
tion Code. 20 The court interpreted Federal Sign as holding "no more than
that the State's mere execution of a contract does not waive its sovereign
immunity from suit."'21
The court focused on the "same fundamental principles of equity [it]
believe[d] prompted the Federal Sign concurring and dissenting opinions"
in concluding that the community college's conduct, other than entering
into the contract, waived its sovereign immunity.22 Specifically, the com-
munity college waived its immunity by: (1) giving instructions to the
plaintiff to exclude specific costs from its bid; (2) establishing a contrac-
tual means to cover these costs with an "equitable adjustment clause;"
and (3) accepting the plaintiff's performance as full and satisfactory, as
indicated by its payment of the full base price and four of the plaintiff's
thirty-two equitable adjustment claims. 23 It appears that the courts will
decide the issue of sovereign immunity on a fact specific basis and will
apply the broad rationale and suggestions of the majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions of Federal Sign.
Another result of Federal Sign is proposed legislation that would add a
chapter allowing a contractor to make a breach of contract claim against
the State to the chief administrative officer of the contracting unit of the
state governmental agency (excluding the Texas Department of Transpor-
tation). 24 If the claim is not resolved, it will go to mediation. If the claim
remains unresolved, it returns to the chief administrative officer for a de-
16. See id. at 417.
17. 980 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. filed).
18. 909 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
19. Alamo, 980 S.W.2d at 749.
20. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 11.151(a), 130.084, & 130.162 (Vernon 1981 & Supp.
1999).
21. Alamo, 980 S.W.2d at 749.
22. Id. at 750.
23. Id.
24. See Tex. S.B. 629, 76th R.S. (1999); see also Tex. H.B. 69, 76th R.S. (1999).
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cision.25 The contractor may then appeal to a State Office of Administra-
tive Hearings. In an apparent attempt to avoid the political problems of
appropriating funds to pay the claim, the agency is to pay claims of
$500,000 or less within thirty days, if so directed by an administrative
judge.26 If the award exceeds $500,000, the proposal is forwarded to the
Speaker of the House and the Lieutenant Governor for a recommenda-
tion of an appropriation. Also, the awards are specifically limited to
twice the value of the contract. As stated, this legislation is not yet in
final form. However, the fallout from Federal Sign has apparently just
begun. Hopefully, the controversial and certainly political issue of sover-
eign immunity will become somewhat more settled in the years to come,
but the wisdom of the great philosopher Yogi Berra should not be
forgotten.
II. IMPLIED DUTY TO COMPLY WITH LOCAL CODES
In the case of Robert D. Tips v. Hartland Developers, Inc.,27 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals determined that no Texas case confirms an
implied duty in a construction contract for the contractor to comply with
local codes. Having so stated, the court went on to rule that contractors
impliedly agree to comply with relevant municipal and county building
codes so that buildings are suitable for their intended purpose in order to
give effect to the expectations of the parties.28 However, the court held
that an implied duty may be negated by other provisions in the contract,
such as the one in Tips.29
The rationale of the court was that contractors, not owners, are in the
best position to know about and comply with relevant building codes.30
Furthermore, a builder is "uniquely situated to know or discover compli-
ance requirements and to bid his or her contract accordingly."' 31 The
court went on to hold that the breach of this implied covenant is a breach
of contract. 32 While the court concluded that, since the parties had
agreed otherwise, there was no implied covenant, the implied covenant of
compliance with building codes created by the court is of substantial sig-
nificance to contractors in Texas.
III. Deceptive Trade Practices Act
In Associated Indemnity Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc.,33 the contrac-
tor was put in default by the owner, who demanded that the surety per-
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. 961 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
28. See id. at 623.
29. See id. (The clear intention of Tips and Hartland was to leave compliance with the
local code issues for resolution at a later time and presumably to cover by change order.).
30. See id. at 622.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. 964 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1998).
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form under the contract. The surety thereafter allegedly settled with the
owner without notice to the contractor. The surety then sued the contrac-
tor pursuant to its indemnity agreement. The contractor counterclaimed
against the surety for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA), fraud, tortious interference with contract,
and negligent misrepresentation. The contractor claimed the surety had
failed to keep him informed, failed to adequately investigate and assert
the contractor's claim of design error, and failed to protect the contrac-
tor's interests during the settlement process. Early in the project, the
contractor felt that the soil conditions might be too unstable. The
owner's engineers told the contractor to continue with the project with
assurances that the design was sound. As the contractor expected, leaks
were found during testing. The contractor blamed the owner's design,
while the owner faulted the installation. The owner declared the contrac-
tor in default after the contractor refused to continue or to make repairs.
To mitigate damages, the surety subsequently agreed to make repairs at a
cost of over $242,000. 34 Meanwhile, a consultant hired by the surety
opined that the owner may have created an "impossible spec to achieve"
given the soil conditions.35
While the dispute continued as to whether the owner or contractor was
responsible for the leaks, the surety, without the contractor's knowledge,
settled with the owner and demanded indemnity from the contractor.36
As stated herein, one part of the contractor's counterclaim was that the
surety had violated the DTPA by engaging in unconscionable conduct,
committing misrepresentations, and concealing information. The con-
tractor contended that by settling the dispute without its knowledge or
consent, the surety had infringed on the contractor's opportunity to re-
solve the dispute through arbitration.
Justice Phillips held that, regarding the contractor's DTPA claims,
there was no evidence that any alleged deceptive acts caused damage to
the contractor. 37 The contractor orally informed the surety that he in-
tended to pursue arbitration. However, the contractor took no further
efforts to enforce its contractual arbitration rights. The Texas Supreme
Court found no evidence that the surety did anything to prevent the con-
tractor from making a timely arbitration demand nor that the surety in-
terfered with the contractor's right to enforce the arbitration
agreement.38 Therefore, there was no evidence of causation. 39 Ulti-
mately, Associated Indemnity did not decide whether the surety commit-
ted deceptive acts, in that the evidence did not prove causation as
34. See id. at 279.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 280.





required under the DTPA.40
IV. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
Also in Associated Indemnity, the contractor argued in its counterclaim
that the surety had a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing in
settling any of the contractor's claims with the owner. The Texas
Supreme Court declined to impose this common law duty of good faith,
because, as it had stated previously, there is no special relationship be-
tween a surety and its principal giving rise to unequal bargaining power.41
The terms of the indemnity agreement at issue are standard in the indus-
try and have been widely upheld by courts.4 2 The Texas Supreme Court
noted that, while the contractor may not have been able to negotiate spe-
cific terms of the indemnity agreement, this in itself did not justify impos-
ing a special duty, because the contractor, unlike typical insureds, was a
construction company with considerable business sophistication. 43 For
this reason, and other policy considerations, the Justices refused to equate
suretyship with insurance and held that a bond surety does not owe a
common law duty of good faith to its principal.44
V. INDEMNITY
In Associated Indemnity, the Texas Supreme Court also recognized the
distinction between a condition precedent for a surety's right to indemni-
fication and a promise to exercise good faith. 45 While the court did not
uphold a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing between a prin-
cipal and its surety, it did hold the surety to the contractually agreed stan-
dard.4 6 In this case, the language of the indemnity agreement required
the surety to exercise good faith in settling claims before it was entitled to
reimbursement from the contractor. Therefore, good faith was a condi-
tion precedent, not a promise, to the surety's right of indemnity.4 7
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the surety's argument that "in
the surety context, bad faith requires more than an unreasonable or negli-
gent investigation; it requires wilful misconduct or improper motive. '48
In determining the parameters of "good faith" in the particular indemnity
agreement, the Texas Supreme Court adhered to a stricter standard and
held that good faith specifically "refers to conduct which is honest in fact,
free of improper motive or wilful ignorance of the facts at hand. '49 Fur-






45. See id. at 283.
46. See id. at 276.
47. See id. at 283.
48. Id. at 284.
49. Id. at 285.
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the surety.511 Noting the fact that the surety did not retain an independent
engineering firm to evaluate the leaks that the surety suspected were, at
least in part, caused by faulty design specification, the court concluded
that this was some evidence of bad faith and upheld that portion of the
contractor's claim.51 The surety did not meet its condition precedent of
good faith under the indemnity agreement and was precluded from relief
under the indemnity agreement.5 2 While the court set forth standards of
good faith favoring the duties of sureties to principals, the specific lan-
guage of every indemnity agreement is crucial. As contractors and sure-
ties are vividly aware, indemnity agreements, whether payment or
performance bonds, are one of the most heavily negotiated clauses in any
construction contract. As a result of Associated Indemnity, it will con-
tinue as such and require detailed review prior to any construction pro-
ject and/or dispute.
VI. CHANGE ORDERS
The decision in Buxani v. Nussbaum 53 demonstrates that an owner and
contractor may vary the written terms of their contract by the way they
conduct themselves during performance of their contractual duties. In
this case, the owner and contractor mutually disregarded a contract provi-
sion requiring that all change orders be in writing. The owner entered
into two written agreements with the contractor for the purpose of re-
modeling and expanding the owner's jewelry store. Both contracts con-
tained a clause reading, "Any alteration or deviation from above
specifications involving extra costs will be executed only upon written or-
ders, and will become an extra charge over and above the estimate. '54
During the course of the remodeling, the owner orally requested extra
work from the contractor and the subcontractors. The extra items re-
quested included: "suspended ceilings, a 'bunch of extras' from the elec-
trician, one-way mirrors with bronze tint instead of aluminum tint,
painting of items not included in the original written contracts, additional
brick work, and the purchase and installation of hand driers. '55 The con-
tractor performed the requested work and presented the owner an item-
ized statement of the additional work performed. The owner refused to
pay for it, and the contractor ceased performance. The contractor sued
the owner for breach of contract, seeking the amount due for the work
performed at the owner's oral request. The owner countersued for
breach of the written contract. The trial judge ruled in favor of the con-
tractor, and the owner appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals, San
Antonio Division, which also ruled in favor of the contractor.5 6
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 286-87.
53. 940 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).





On appeal, the owner asserted that there was no oral contract for the
extra work; hence, there was no "meeting of the minds," or mutual as-
sent. "When only the meeting of the minds is disputed, the existence of a
contract is a question of fact," and mutual assent can be deemed to arise
from the one party's acts and conduct from which the other can reason-
ably draw the inference of a promise.57 The court ruled that the trial
court easily could have found mutual assent based on the acts and con-
duct of the owner.58 The owner assented to the terms of the oral agree-
ment expressly and through his conduct; the contractor previously told
the owner that an additional charge would be required for the extra
items, and the owner agreed to pay for the extra work. Thereafter, the
owner allowed the items to be installed and the services to be performed
without objecting to anything until time for payment arrived. 59
The ruling in this case may prove helpful to contractors seeking addi-
tional compensation in the face of "written change orders only" language
in their contracts. Conversely, owners may elaborate or expand their
"written change orders only" language by adding a clause similar to the
one set out below (despite this language, there can be no assurance that
another court would not rule the same way as did the Buxani court):
No oral agreement, action, omission, conduct, prior failure, or course
of conduct by the Owner shall act to waive, amend, modify, change,
or alter the requirement that change orders must be in writing signed
by the Owner and the Contractor, and that such written change or-
ders are the exclusive method for effecting any change; and the Con-
tractor understands and agrees that the Contract cannot be changed
by oral agreement, actions, inactions, course of conduct, or implied
change order.
VII. DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
Construction claims most often arise out of defective plans, an unfore-
seen work stoppage, encountering an unknown condition, or some combi-
nation thereof. Such claims are made under a "changes," "extra work,"
"suspension of work," or "differing site conditions" clause contained in
the contract. Most construction contracts attempt to limit or restrict the
contractor's right to recover delay damages, home office overhead, profit,
and related items. Consequently, contractual remedies may prove insuffi-
cient in certain instances-particularly if the owner's conduct has been
particularly egregious-and in such cases the contractor may look beyond
the contract for avenues of relief and avoidance of the contractual limita-
tion on remedies. Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Engineers & Con-
tractors, Inc.60 illustrates this concept.




60. 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
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In this case, the contractor, Presidio, was the low bidder on a contract
to build 300 concrete foundations in connection with the expansion of a
Formosa owned plant. Pursuant to the court's findings, the bid package
for the project specifically represented that: "(1) Presidio would arrange
and be responsible for the scheduling, ordering, and delivery of all mater-
ials, including those paid for by Formosa; (2) work was to progress con-
tinually from commencement to completion; and (3) the job was
scheduled to ... be completed in 90 days." 61
In actuality, Formosa took over the scheduling, ordering, and delivery
of concrete and permitted multiple disruptions to Presidio's operations by
other contractors. Thus, the project took eight months to complete. As a
result, rather than the $370,000 included in the bid for direct costs, Pre-
sidio incurred some $831,000 in direct costs to complete the work.62
Presidio filed suit based on fraudulent inducement of contract, among
other causes of action. At trial, Presidio introduced evidence that For-
mosa had implemented "an intentional, premeditated scheme to defraud
the contractors working on its expansion project. ' 63 Though the contract
specifically stated that Formosa would pay for delays caused by its own
actions, "when the contractors requested delay damages under the con-
tract, Formosa would rely on its superior economic position and offer the
contractors far less than the full and fair value of the delay damages. '64
The "head of Formosa's contract administration division, [even] testified
that Formosa, in an effort to lower costs, would utilize its economic supe-
riority to string contractors along and force them to settle. '65 Based on
this evidence, the jury awarded Presidio tort damages for fraudulent in-
ducement of the contract. Included in the award were amounts for lost
profits and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000,000.66
Formosa challenged the award on appeal, in part, claiming that Pre-
sidio could not recover pure economic losses in tort for injuries that arose
solely from a contract. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. It held that
each person has an independent legal duty to refrain from inducing an-
other into entering a contract through fraudulent misrepresentation. 67
Moreover, "a party is not bound by a contract procured by fraud. ' 68 As
such, "tort damages are recoverable for a fraudulent inducement claim
irrespective of whether the fraudulent representations are later subsumed
in a contract or whether the plaintiff only suffers an economic loss related
to the subject matter of the contract. ' 69
61. Id. at 43.
62. See id. at 49-50.
63. Id. at 44. Under the scheme, Formosa misrepresented conditions to be encoun-




66. See id. at 44.
67. See id. at 46.
68. Id. at 46.
69. Id. at 47.
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The Formosa Plastics decision does not mean that contractual limita-
tions and restrictions on damage recoveries are unenforceable or lightly
regarded. It and similar cases do mean, however, that such clauses can
not be used as "get out of jail free cards," exculpating parties for ex-
contractual liability arising from tort conduct. As is true in all construc-
tion dispute cases, three key factors will shape the outcome-the facts,
the facts, and the facts.
The rule stated by the court in Formosa Plastics demonstrates one pos-
sible method of avoiding contractual limitations on damages-establish-
ment of an independent tort. Other vehicles may also be available, as
demonstrated in other jurisdictions. In Warner Construction Corp. v. City
of Los Angeles,70 the contractor sued for fraudulent concealment of ma-
terial facts related to subsurface conditions. After finding that the public
entity had withheld material facts, a California court held that the af-
fected contractor could recover, assuming proper proof of loss, lost prof-
its, and costs associated with impairment of capital, loss of business,
restriction of research, reduction of bonding capacity, and destruction of
a former advantageous competitive position. 71
After issuing its opinion in Formosa Plastics, the court was given an-
other opportunity to consider the requirements of those seeking recovery
outside the parameters of their contract, similar to the issue presented to
the California court in Warner. In D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro Independent
School District,72 the Texas Supreme Court distinguished Formosa Plas-
tics. In Formosa Plastics the court rejected any requirement of an in-
dependent injury in fraudulent inducement claims; in D.S.A., Inc. the
court held that unlike fraudulent inducement claims, negligent misrepre-
sentation claims only invoke liability for out-of-pocket damages. 73 The
court refused to afford recovery of benefit of the bargain damages where
the basis of the claim is negligent misrepresentation. In so ruling, the
court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552B in distin-
guishing between fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresenta-
tion.74 The court also rejected a claim for finding of exemplary damages
based on a theory of grossly negligent misrepresentation. 75 While For-
mosa Plastics might have led some to expect a different outcome in this
regard, the court's position is consistent with the existing rule that since
an intentional breach of contract does not entitle one to exemplary dam-
ages, a breach of contract involving gross negligence on the part of the
party in breach cannot support such an award.
In State Bank & Trust Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West,76 a bank made a
claim for conversion when a surety used the tools and equipment of the
70. 466 P.2d 996 (1970) (en banc).
71. See id. at 1007.
72. 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1998).
73. See id. at 664.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. 132 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 1997).
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defaulting subcontractor to complete the project. In the case at issue, the
prime contractor defaulted on its prime contracts and on its loan with the
bank. The surety subsequently entered into takeover agreements and, in
performing the work, used various materials stored at the project sites.
When the bank demanded to be provided with its collateral (i.e., the
materials or their value), the surety refused, arguing that its rights as the
takeover surety took priority over the bank's security interest in the con-
struction materials. 77 The bank then brought suit against the surety in
state court, alleging conversion. The suit was subsequently removed to
federal court, which granted summary judgment for the surety. 78 The
bank appealed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that in a typical surety ar-
rangement, the surety bonds a contractor's performance with the project
owner.79 "If the bonded contractor defaults, forcing the surety to com-
plete the performance, the completing surety 'has an equitable right to
indemnification out of a retained fund."' 0 "The surety is [then] subro-
gated to the rights of the project owner/obligee so that the retained con-
tract price inures to the completing surety's benefit. '81
The court further pointed out that the completing surety's right of sub-
rogation arises "as an outgrowth of the suretyship relationship itself; it is
not dependent on assignment, lien, or contract. '82 As such, the surety's
right of subrogation is not subject to the filing requirements of the
UCC.83 The court of appeals noted that in reaching its decision, the dis-
trict court relied on Interfirst Bank to hold that "by virtue of equitable
subrogation [the surety] was entitled to use [the contractor's] construc-
tion materials located at the project sites to complete the construction,
notwithstanding [the bank's] pre-existing, perfected security interest in
those materials."84
The district court reasoned that (1) there is no conceptual difference
between permitting a surety to apply contract balances towards pro-
ject completion and permitting it to use the defaulting subcontrac-
tor's tools, equipment, and inventory for the same purpose, and (2)
because, under Jnterfirst Bank, a surety's equitable right to contract
proceeds has priority over a secured creditor's right to execute on its
security interest in the same proceeds, the [surety's] right to use [the
contractor's] construction materials has priority over [the bank's] se-
curity interests in the same property. 85
77. See id. at 205.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. (citing Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962)).
81. Id. (citing Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bellmead State Bank of Waco, 396 S.W.2d
163, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
82. Id. at 206 (citing Interfirst Bank Dallas v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 774 S.W.2d






[The bank] argue[d] that surety priority under Interfirst Bank is lim-
ited to situations in which the surety and the secured creditor [here,
the bank] make competing claims to contract proceeds; that when,
[as in the case presented], the collateral on which the secured credi-
tor seeks to execute is tangible personal property, equity does not
entitle the surety to be equitably subrogated to its principal's rights
in the property. In support of its argument, the bank maintains that,
as between the surety and an assignee of the contract proceeds, equi-
table subrogation gives the surety priority because the assignee's in-
terest in the proceeds never becomes an actuality. The assignee's
interest is derivative of the assignor/contractor's right to the
proceeds.86
The court agreed "that when tangible personal property-distinct from
contract proceeds-is at issue, the rationale for elevating the surety over
the secured creditor has no application. '87 "[S]ecured creditors holding
perfected security interests in a defaulting contractor's tangible personal
property retain their priority over a completing surety's equitable
claims."' 88 The surety's argument that: (a) it is only claiming an equitable
right to use the property-not an outright ownership in it; (b) the bank's
security interest is still intact; and (c) fundamental fairness dictates that
the surety use the defaulting contractor's tools and supplies to minimize
loss and expense, was rejected by the court as "misguided. '8 9 In the
court's view:
The surety's right to contract proceeds flows not from cost minimiza-
tion considerations but from 'the common sense proposition that the
contract retainage funds would never become available to any credi-
tor unless the surety completed the project.' On the other hand,
when collateral consists of tangible personal property, the surety's
completion of the contract is not a condition precedent to the con-
ception of the collateral itself; rather, the creditor who holds a per-
fected security interest in a contractor's tools, equipment, and
inventory may execute on its collateral regardless of whether the
contractor has performed its obligations to third parties. Thus, eq-
uity need not intervene to elevate the surety over the secured credi-
tor as 'the surety has done nothing with respect to [the tools,
equipment, and inventory] which raises up in the surety an equity
superior to that of later judgment creditors.' 9°
The court held that a perfected security interest has priority over the
surety's rights under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 91 The court
reasoned that the issue was tangible personal property, to which the se-
curity interest attaches, and not the contract proceeds, to which the doc-
86. Id. at 206-07.
87. Id. at 207.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 208.
90. Id. (citing United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. United Penn Bank, 524 A.2d
958, 965 (1987), appeal denied 536 A.2d 1333 (1987)).
91. See id. at 207.
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trine of equitable subrogation is relevant.92 Since the bonding company
offered no proof or authority that its rights in the contract proceeds
should be elevated above the security interest in the property, the court
found that the bank's security interest took priority over the bonding
company's interest.93
92. See id.
93. See id.
[Vol. 52
